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Abstract
On 18 May 1996, the Supreme Constitutional Court of 
Egypt upheld Case No. 8, which discussed the constitu-
tionality of an administrative act of the Ministry of Educa-
tion which, regulating the uniforms that should be used 
in Egyptian public schools, prohibited the use of a veil. 
The article exposes the factual content that involved the 
case, analyzing this decision through the fundamental 
right to religious freedom and the necessary limits that 
must be imposed in a liberal interpretation of Islamic 
Law.
Keywords: Islamic Law; veil; public school; religious free-
dom; Egypt
Resumo
Em 18 de Maio de 1996, a Suprema Corte Constitucional do 
Egito julgou o caso nº 8, no qual se discutia a constituciona-
lidade de um ato administrativo do Ministério da Educação 
que, ao regular os uniformes que deveriam ser utilizados 
nas escolas públicas egípcias, proibiu a utilização de véu. 
O artigo expõe o conteúdo fático que envolveu o caso, 
analisando essa decisão através do direito fundamental à 
liberdade religiosa e os limites necessários que devem ser 
impostos a uma interpretação liberal da Lei Islâmica. 
 
Palavras-chave: Lei Islâmica; véu; escola pública; liberda-
de religiosa; Egito.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Case No.8 of 1996 is a landmark decision of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional 
Court (“SCC”) and represents one of the most significant judicial rulings of a structural 
remedy for the interpretation of Article 2 of Egypt 2014 Constitution. The jurisprudence 
of the SCC is essential to advance a moderate (liberal), rights-protecting interpretation 
of Sharie‘a. In this case, the SCC held that a rule on face-veiling in public schools is 
compatible not only with Islamic law, but with certain human rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution:, as freedom of expression and freedom of religion. This decision de-
alt with the SCC’s view on Islamic ijtihad (legal reasoning), and, gives insight into the 
Court’s views on civil and political rights context. Further, this case offers fascinating 
prospects for comparative constitutional law experts, and international human rights 
activists, as laws restricting women’s rights, (particularly to cover/veil) have been con-
fronted as unconstitutional in several Arab and European countries (Headscarves in the 
headlines 2004). Indeed, the SCC judgment facilitated fruitful comparative analysis and 
debate on the free exercise of religion, freedom of expression, children and women’s 
rights. This case has been featured as a cornerstone in Middle Eastern constitutional 
theories, as it examined Egypt’s constitutional jurisprudence–which has the power to 
review the constitutionality of laws and decrees, interpretation of Islamic law. It has 
developed its private adequate “interpretation from within” of spiritual norms–facing a 
liberal-religious split, as Egypt have observed a substantial growth in the phenomena 
of extreme Islamism, under Presidents Gamal ‘Abdelnasser, Anwar Sādāt, and recently 
under the exiled President Mohammad Morsi ousted by the popular protests on June 
30, and the military on July 3, 2013.1
This brief article first covers (in Part II) the background of the case and its facts, 
before turning in (Part III) to the holding itself and its most noticeable feature–the 
Court’s declaration of a liberal interpretation of the Sharie‘a law. Part IV provides a de-
tailed assessment of that ruling, addressing the impact of the case both within and 
outside of Egypt, as constitutional courts in Mediterranean countries, as in Egypt, have 
situated themselves as central secularizing powers in their societies. Also, it proposes 
that the ever-accelerating confidence on domestic supreme judicial bodies in religious 
constitutionalism concerning religion and state enquiries offers significant understan-
dings for accepting the political roots of judicial authority and the circumstances under 
which political aspect to the judiciary is probably to ensue.
1  ‘ARAFA, Mohamed. Whither Egypt? Against Religious Fascism and Legal Authoritarianism: Pure Revolution, 
Popular Coup, or a Military Coup d’état? Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, Indianopolis, 
vol. 24, n. 4, p. 859-897, 2014. p. 865-871.
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2. THE PARTIES AND THE MAIN FACTS OF CASE 8/1996
On May 18, 1996, the SCC under the Presidency (Chief Justice) of Counselor Dr. 
‘Awad el-Murr, and [with] the membership of other seven chief justices, including the 
Commissioners Body’s President and the secretary general, referred to the Court from 
the Administrative Court by decision issued in Case No. 21 of judicial year 49 under-
taken by Mahmoud Sami Wasil, in his capacity [as a guardian] of his two daughters, Ma-
riam and Hajir against the Education Minister, the director of the Alexandria’s Education 
Board, and the Isis’s Manger Girls High School in al-Siyuf. Regarding the procedures, 
the Alexandria Administrative Court ruled that the file should be referred to the SCC to 
check the constitutionality of the Ministerial Decision No. 113 of 1994 [as expounded by 
Decision No.208/1994]. Then, the State Litigation Authority–the body that is charge of 
representing the state in litigation–submitted a memorandum defending the govern-
mental [decree] and requesting case’s denial. The Commissioners Apparatus then pre-
pared a report with its opinion.2 It should be noted that Egyptian administrative courts 
have crucial jurisdiction over cases in which the state [government] is a party and this 
case focuses on the actions of the school’s Manger, who is performing in accordance 
with an official administrative decree issued by the Education Minister. Yet, adminis-
trative courts are not allowed to interpret the Constitution, so when challenged with a 
case that requires a constitutional’ interpretation, it must refer it [on renvoi] to the SCC, 
which is permitted, on its competence, to decide non-constitutional matters and to 
issue a final ruling in the case.3
Briefly in this case, two daughters, filed Case No. 21(49) at Alexandria Adminis-
trative Court against the Education Minister in which their [father] required a presiding 
awkward application of and stopping the negative judgment that had been issued 
excluding entry of his daughters into their school. The daughters have been expelled 
from the school–when he had gone with them to the Isis school and was surprised–due 
to the enactment of a decision by the Education’s Minister proscribing female students 
wearing the niqab (veil) from entering, a decree in which the father proclaims that re-
presents a direct transgression of Articles 2 and 53 among others of the Constitution, 
regarding the Islamic law’s understanding and equality in public rights and duties.4 The 
father claimed that Article 2 reads that “Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its 
official language. The principles of Islamic Sharie‘a are the principle source of legislation” 
2  ELMORR Awad et al. The Supreme Constitutional Court and Its Role in the Egyptian Judicial System. In: BOYLE, 
Kevin; SHERIF, Adel (Eds.). Human Rights and Democracy – The Role of the Supreme Constitutional Court 
of Egypt. Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996. p. 37-53.
3  SHERIF, Adel. Constitutional Law. In: MAUGIRON Nathalie; DUPRET Baudouin (Eds.). Egypt and its Laws. Lon-
don : Kluwer law international, 2002. p. 325-330.
4  ELMORR, Awad. The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt and the Protection of Human and Political Rights. 
In: MALLAT, Chibli (Ed.). Islam and Public Law. [s.l.]: Springer Netherlands, 1992. p. 229-258.
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and Article 53–confirms the conservation of personal freedom [and bans] any violation 
to it–as it stipulates that “Citizens are equal before the law, possess equal rights and public 
duties, and may not be discriminated against on the basis of religion, belief, sex, origin, 
race, color, language, disability, social class, political or geographical affiliation, or for any 
other reason. Discrimination . . . are crimes punishable by the law. The State shall take all 
necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination . . .” 
During its examination of the case and the motion to suspend execution of the 
defendant’s ministerial decree, the SCC recited that the Administrative Court based its 
decision on the fact that the [high school’s] decision to dismiss the girls was based on 
Decree 113/1994 [issued on August 17, 1994 by Educational Minister] which detailed the 
school uniform in its form, color, and configuration, and clarified by ministerial decree 
No. 208/1994. The SCC recited that “is within the exclusive competence of the SCC to 
decide whether these two decisions violate freedom of religion protected in the Cons-
titution . . .”. Legally speaking, the Egyptian legal system creates a hierarchy of legisla-
tive enactments as follows: (a) constitution; (b) statute; (c) regulation (bylaw), and (d) 
decree/decision. In this case, the “decree” being confronted and thus, is a formal admi-
nistrative act.5
3. THE SCC’S HOLDING
The SCC decided against the defendant, concluding that the contested Decision 
does not contradict the Constitutional provisions in any way. Further, it stated that the 
dad raised remedies only under constitutional provisions 2 and 53. Through its ex-offi-
cio jurisdiction, the SCC, though, has found that Article 64 concerns are tacitly involved 
in the case, which reads “Freedom of belief is absolute. The freedom of practicing religious 
rituals and establishing places of worship for the followers of revealed religions is a right or-
ganized by law.” The Court defined the freedom created in this provision as “freedom of 
‘aqida (creed) rather than freedom of din (religion)”.6 Also, it said that “it is obvious from 
the provisions of Decree113/1994 that male and female students in public and private 
schools are required to wear a single uniform with the following features:
a. First, Primary Phase, Boys/Girls: A linen apron in the color selected by the ed-
ucational board, it is allowed to wear pants in winter . . . [if it is] appropriate 
according to what the educational directorate has decided. Girls can substi-
tute for the apron a blouse and skirt of appropriate length and for boys . . . 
5  RUGH, Andrea. Reveal and Conceal: Dress in Contemporary Egypt. Syracuse: Syracuse University Publica-
tions in Continuing Education, 1987.
6  BROWN, Nathan; LOMBARDI, Clark. The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and 
Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 
(May 18, 1996). American University International Law Review, Washington, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 437-460, june 
2006. p. 444-445.
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b. Second, Elementary Phase:
1. Boy Students: Long pants-shirt in appropriate color, in the winter a sweater . 
. . may be worn in accordance . . . directorate decides.
2. Girl Pupils: White blouse-linen apron with suspenders in the color chosen by 
the educational Board . . . The apron may be replaced with a long blouse of 
appropriate length . . . Upon written request from the guardian, the student 
may wear a hair cover in a color selected by the educational Board, if does 
not obscure the face.
a. Third, High School Period:
1. Male Students: Long pants-shirt in an appropriate color . . . to educational 
board decides.
2. Female Students: White blouse-skirt of appropriate length . . . upon written 
request from the guardian, the student may wear a hair cover in a color se-
lected . . ., if does not obscure the face.”
Also, the decree states that school uniforms for both male and female students 
in every school will be posted in a visible place at least two months prior to the begin-
ning of the school and students who violate the decision may not enter their school or 
be affiliated with it. In order to avoid any sort of ambiguity in this decree, the Minister 
of Education enacted a second decree clarifying the former one and identifying its con-
tent, which reads: 
First, regarding female students within elementary and high schools:
a. “Upon written request from the guardian” means that the guardian [dad] 
must be cognizant of the student’s will (choice) to wear hair veil, and that the 
choice comes from her own free will without pressure/coercion from an in-
dividual other than the custodian. The student shall not be prohibited from 
entering her school if she wears a hair scarf and her entry shall take place 
awaiting upon examination of the guardian’s awareness.
b. “Hair Cover” means that the cover that the student selects according to her 
own free will may not cover the face. No examples . . . for hair covering shall 
be contravene this.
Second, regarding all students in the whole educational phases: The uniform 
shall be proper in appearance and the style in which it is worn, conserving the uniform 
within the society’s morals, traditions [teachings]. Each uniform that invades these rules 
considers a violation of the school uniform; and it is not allowed for the girl student 
wearing one to get in her school.7 This holding has been documented to understand, 
7  BROWN, Nathan; LOMBARDI, Clark. The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and 
Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 
(May 18, 1996). American University International Law Review, Washington, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 437-460, june 
2006. p. 446.
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the method in which the SCC applies its recent perspective to improve a secular, rights-
-protecting elucidation of Sharie‘a, that secured under the Constitution. 
Accordingly, the SCC has been reliable in interpreting what the Constitution 
instructs in its second article since its amendment in 1980–confirming that the prin-
ciples of Islamic Sharie‘a are [the] chief source of legislation. The Court has said that the 
principles of the Islamic Sharie‘a bind both the legislative and executive authorities. 
Among those, are the provisions of the challenged Decree113/1994 [explicated by De-
cree 208/1994] that it is not permitted for any statutory text to contradict the Sharie‘a 
rulings: al-ahkam al-shar‘iyya alqat‘iyya fi elthubut wa aldalalah (these rulings only not 
subject to ijtihad (analogy), as they indicate the mabadi’a kulliyya (universal principles) 
and its usuliha al-thabita (fixed roots), which admit neither interpretation nor replace-
ment that are unequivocally certain regarding their authenticity and meaning, hence, 
ijtihad is forbidden, so it is unconceivable that the explanation of [such values] would 
amended with a change of time and place, as it is haram (forbidden) to breach them or 
rotate their meaning. Over time, Egypt’s SCC outlined an approach to such cases, based 
on the modernist Islamic thought, led by a diverse religious scholars, that focused on 
the query of how to cognize (interpret) the Sharie‘a in an appropriate manner for a 
modern society’s needs. 
The Court pointed out “that the use of reasoning, where there is no [scriptural] 
text, develops qawa‘id ‘amliyya (practical guidelines) that are, in their implications, sof-
ter for the folks and more concerned with their daily affairs and [that] better defend 
their masalihhim al-haqiqiyya (true interests).8 Thus, statutory texts seek to recognize 
factual welfares in a suitable way for the individuals, confirming that the essence of 
God’s law [Sharie‘a] is justice, and that closing it (i.e. prohibiting re-interpretation) is 
neither adequate nor necessary, as the Prophet’s companions who used ijtihad, often 
created decisions totally motivated by the public interests keeping them from darar 
(harm), and saving them from pain, bearing in mind that these benefits grow in light 
of the circumstances of the society’s needs.” Legally speaking, the legislator bound by 
the constitutional parameters and cannot exceed, contravene, or decline them.9 Then 
the Court recited “this is the Islamic [Sharie‘a] in its usuliha wa manabitiha (roots and 
sources), developing by necessity, declining [stringency]. In situations where there is no 
[obvious] text, ijtihad is only constrained by its dawabituha alkulliyya (universal controls) 
8  BROWN, Nathan; LOMBARDI, Clark. The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and 
Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 
(May 18, 1996). American University International Law Review, Washington, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 437-460, june 
2006.
9  BROWN, Nathan; LOMBARDI, Clark. The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and 
Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 
(May 18, 1996). American University International Law Review, Washington, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 437-460, june 
2006.
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and Islamic law goals are not congested, it is not permitted to require the wali al’amr 
(follow mere) opinions in issues of the practical Islamic al-ahkam al-fara‘iyya (legal ru-
lings) that subject to development per se.” Also, the orthodox Islamic scholars’ views on 
subjects related to Sharie‘a are not granted any inviolability [sanctity] or placed beyond 
assessment or verification, as they can be switched by other [Islamic interpretations]. In 
the same vein, opinions based on ijtihad in contested queries do not have any binding 
force per se applying to those who do not claimed them, as it is not acceptable to hold 
[such opinions] to be stable, established that Islamic law cannot be infringed.
The Court defined in its ruling ijtihad and its functions, as it “must track methods 
of reasoning out the alahkam (rulings) and al-qawa‘id al-dabita (mandatory chains) for 
the Sharie‘a furu‘(branches), preserving the main maqasid (objectives)”.10 Thus, the SCC 
has approved its influential authorization devotedly and has responded with a robust 
disposition to use its validity and recently enlarged policymaking ability to improve a 
reasonable liberal interpretation of Sharie‘a norms, as in most cases, «ijtihad» is requi-
red.11 Accordingly, the SCC has shifted from the prehistoric traditions of fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence) or the collective facts and studying the schools of jurisprudential thou-
ght and has established a new framework for deducing and understanding Islamic law 
as the fallible human effort to apprehend the content of that guidance. Then the Court 
elaborated: “. . . there is no duty to legislate following the classical fiqh contents, as the 
new legislation must not be in contrast with the bulk of the law, but only after enact-
ment and must achieve the «common good»” (Ibid.). It should be noted that the legal 
interpretation of SCC must be outlined considering the religion’s role “at large” in the 
society, as a cultural factor, even in a strictly legal perspective, and hence, the SCC role 
is not to establish the religion in the legal system, rather is a symbolic reference of the 
religion’s importance in the Egyptian society. So, the point is not so much whether the 
SCC is mentioned in the Constitution or not, but rather its legal tie must be accommo-
dated with the liberal commitment to democratize the society.12
Further, the SCC highlighted that “it is responsible for the obligation to watch 
out for any transgression of these Islamic rulings that are absolutely certain and to 
transpose any [legislative] qai‘da (rule) that contradicts them. This provision located 
the Sharie‘a rulings in a superior place over these [statutory] rules.”.13 One should bear 
in mind that these [judgments] are [the Sharie‘a] general structure and initial columns, 
10  LOMBARDI, Clark. State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt. Leida: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006.
11  BROWN, Nathan. The Rule of Law in the Ancient World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997.
12  Rector of the Azhar Univ. v. President of the Republic, Case No. 20 of Judicial Year No. 1 (Sup. Const. Ct. 
1985), translated in 1 Arab L.Q. 100, 104 (Saba Habachy trans., 1986)
13  BROWN, Nathan. Islamic Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice. In: COTRAN, Eugene; SHERIF, Adel. (Eds.). 
Democracy, the Rule of Law and Islam. Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999.
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whose stresses enforce themselves enduringly and avert creation of any legal rule that 
interrupts them.14 Also, it stated that “this is not to be considered detrimental/nega-
tion of what is known by ‘alim min al-din bi al-darura (necessity of religion); al-ahkam 
al-zanniyya (presumptive rulings) are not categorically definite on their authenticity, 
meaning, or both”)15. They fall under ijtihad which is limited and beyond which does 
not cover. They improve by their nature-changing according to time period and place, 
in order to assure their flexibility and vitality, and to confront different events per se.16 
Also, it touched on legislator’s authority [limits] within huquq (rights’) regulation, as dis-
regarding or curtailing constitutional public rights outbreaks fields of vivacity and like-
wise it is prohibited to regulate these rights in a manner that contradicts their meaning; 
as its regulation must be unbiased and reasonable.
The Court said “It is obvious that the arguments . . . regarding the challenged 
Decree, along with those made by the plaintiff [students’ Dad] . . . deal basically with 
the female’ requested uniforms (features and wearing way…) and the covering manner. 
The questioned instructed that each girl within the educational phases have a prescri-
bed uniform style that protects her general features (proper for her and that does not 
disclose what must be covered), and wearing style must safeguard her modesty within 
the society’s ethical traditions.” The Court described the Islamic law stance on shaping 
the individual personality and said “jawhar al-ahkam (ruling’s essence) is the most sig-
nificant for defending the creed . . . On belief’s, women activities must be most pure of 
heart and most summoned to piety, as Islam raised the woman’s share and inspired her 
to maintain her ‘afetiha (chastity), ordered her to defend herself from degradation, so 
she would locate herself above things that could dishonor her, particularly via her dress, 
sensitivity in speech, walking’s tweak, . . . [The woman] does not have the right to spon-
taneously select her dress as she wants, select it according to her fancy, or claim that her 
costume is only her personal demand . . . However, her cloth style is not fixed by nusus 
maqtu‘ biha fi thubutiha aw dalalatiha (theological scripts that have been dogged to be 
definite on its authenticity/meaning). Consequently, women’s attire is a debatable issue 
in which ijtihad never ends, as they remain open within a secure, general framework 
defined by the Qur’anic provisions (Qur’an 24:31 & 33:59) and it cannot be concluded 
that a woman’s cloth cannot be altered as long as they do not contradict an absolutely 
certain text, and acceptable recurring ‘urf (prevailing customs). 
14  LOMBARDI, Clark. Designing Islamic Constitutions: Past Trends and Options for a Democratic Future. Inter-
national Journal of Constitutional Law, Washington, vol. 11, n. 3, p. 615-645, sept. 2013.
15  Awad-Allah v. Abd-El-Al, Decision 28, Judicial Year 1 (May 4, 1985).
16  ‘ARAFA, Mohamed. Whither Egypt? Against Religious Fascism and Legal Authoritarianism: Pure Revolution, 
Popular Coup, or a Military Coup d’état? Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, Indianopolis, 
vol. 24, n. 4, p. 859-897, 2014. p. 888-889.
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Additionally, the Court recited that classical scholars disagreed among themsel-
ves regarding the interpretation of Qur’anic provisions and of what has been conveyed 
from the Prophet within the authentic and weak (non-authentic) hadiths and only agre-
ed upon that Islamic law in its essence entails her cloth’s regulation.17 They have been 
agreeing upon not placing women in uncomfortable circumstances (her whole body 
were considered ‘awra [sexual private parts]), as she must perform tasks that will in-
volve her mixing with others.18 Muslim jurists in consensus of that her clothing shall 
fulfill two elements, necessity and customs/traditions’ maintenance. Accordingly, it is 
not acceptable for her to surpass the moderation’ boundaries and should not cover 
her entire body so as to restrict her. Under the theory of al–ahkam al–khamsa(h) (the 
Scale of Five Qualifications), on the proscription of a thing, it should not related to so-
mething ihtemali (probable), but to nass qat‘i (unquestionable certain text) and if not, 
it will become conceivable based on the al-ibaha [al-asl fi il’ashi’a al-ibaha] (permissi-
bility norm). And then, there is no dalil (indictor) in the Qur’anic texts or Sunnah legally 
conforming female’s clothing, to be ratified by the Sharie‘a, [so, must veil totally; [niqab 
or bourquo‘ included] . . . is not an acceptable analysis, nor is it known by necessity of 
religion . . . Therefore, a complete veiling of a woman is not known by necessity to be 
shar‘i (legally certain), and covering her whole beauty is not confirmed by the law, but 
her appearance must protect her modest mentality, expedite her genuine input in whi-
ch her [private] life affairs require, [must] defend her from humiliation, and keeping her 
out of ithm/fasad (sin).19
Thus, after careful provisional reviewing within the challenged decree designa-
tes that each student [may] wear a cover that does not hide the face and that she has se-
lected based on her free will, provided that her guardian verifies that veiling her head is 
not a result of coercion (intervening in her affairs) but rises according to her aspiration, 
[a certification] which may be given after she starts her studies. Also, the decision spe-
cifies that [a schoolgirl’s] uniform must be proper according to her personal values in 
a manner that preserve her modesty and consistent with the society’s morals and cus-
toms. Based on the aforementioned reasons, the Court stipulated that the “challenged 
Decree does not contradict, the explicit text of Article 2 and in debatable matters, the 
wali al’amr (leader) has the authority (right) to develop his/her own ijtihad to assist the 
individuals’ affairs and redirect what is accurate from the surrounding traditions, as long 
as they do not contradict the Sharie‘a maqasid (universal spirit).” And the “ministerial 
17  BROWN, Nathan; LOMBARDI, Clark. Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari‘a Threaten Human Ri-
ghts? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law. American Univer-
sity International Law Review, Washington, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 179-435, june 2006.
18  WEHR, Hans. A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic [s.l.]: Milton Cowan ed., 1974.
19  BROWN, Nathan; LOMBARDI, Clark. Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari‘a Threaten Human Ri-
ghts? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law. American Univer-
sity International Law Review, Washington, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 179-435, june 2006.
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decree just obliges each female student in various educational phases to wear a suita-
ble uniform, which shades her without revealing her and which covers her nakedness . 
. . and her style wearing must evade this and be appropriate to the religious standards, 
which attach her by necessity to the societal ethics and based on that decision, [a fema-
le student] may cover only her head and not hide her face or palms.” On the freedom of 
religion, the court said that the concept of this freedom does not grant the fortification 
to someone practicing his/her belief in a way that may harms other faiths. Nor is the 
state to purport either secretly or publicly conversion to a faith under its protection, 
forcing others to embrace it and may not interfere by punishing those who practice a 
creed that it has not validated (agnostics), as mostly in Egypt they only acknowledge 
the three Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam).20  The Court recited:     
Nor may the freedom of belief be separated from the freedom to worship/practice its 
rites and this why the Constitution required when it connected these two liberties, by 
instructing that freedom of faith and freedom to practice spiritual deeds are guaranteed. 
The second represents the indicator of the first . . . this makes it promising to say that the 
first freedom […] is unlimited. The second freedom […] may be restricted by ordering it 
sustaining some of the higher welfares associated with it, what links it with the conser-
vancy of the public order and moral ideals and the resistance of the others’ rights and 
their freedoms  
The plaintiff claimed that the decree infringes personal freedom, arguing that 
this freedom’s backbone is the self-independence of each individual in all matters ba-
sed on life privacy (its conditions, model, characters, etc…). The Court said “In fact, this 
[argument] is rejected and thus the challenged decree doesn’t invade the religious fre-
edom, rescind its basics, or impede the spiritual practice or confront the din (religion’s 
essence) in its al-usul al-kulliyya (common heritages) that the Islamic law created”.21 “It 
articulates the acceptable application of ijtihad targeting only to adjust girls’ dress in 
educational institutions. Although, education is a public right assured by the State and 
its supervision according to the constitution, State should never ever intervene in these 
very personal matters of the individual’s private life (privacy right) based on unjusti-
fied grounds of watching over the whole educational process in all its mechanisms and 
to maintain the connections between education and society’s necessities.” Finally, the 
Court recited that the “State’s regulation of male and female student’s affairs in some 
20  BROWN, Nathan; LOMBARDI, Clark. Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari‘a Threaten Human Ri-
ghts? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law. American Univer-
sity International Law Review, Washington, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 179-435, june 2006.
21  ‘ARAFA, Mohamed. Whither Egypt? Against Religious Fascism and Legal Authoritarianism: Pure Revolution, 
Popular Coup, or a Military Coup d’état? Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, Indianopolis, 
vol. 24, n. 4, p. 859-897, 2014. p. 887.
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organizations is acceptable through the logical correlation between its content and its 
purposes and this is fulfilled in this case in which the questioned Decree established 
school’s uniform style within the various educational phases. This Decree did not re-
lease the male and female clothing from all limits, but it regulate it to reach modesty 
and suitability standards and to conserving their mental and physical health, and not 
disturbing their religious values and not isolating them.” 
4. THE IMPACT AND INFLUENCE OF CASE 8/1996 (ASSESSMENT)
This case, touched on several aspects of policy and decision-making, including 
harmonization with domestic authorities regarding the application of Islamic law or the 
interpretation of the Sharie‘a Clause Guarantee (“SCG”), as an eternity clause. Although 
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the governmental decree and ruled that the 
appropriate Sharie‘a commands were contestable, lithe, and subject to development, it 
also ruled that the relevant religious (divine) law was not sacred and could be modified, 
adjusted/replaced. The Court succeeded in vastly increasing the elaboration in which 
a woman wore clothes that were modest and didn’t show any ‘aura, she was enduring 
by the Sharie‘a spirit.22 The SCC’s ruling on the niqab matter is remarkable. First, the SCC 
echoed its obligation on a potential implementation of Article 2 to laws endorsed after 
the 1980’s historical amendment.23 Second, it extended the SCC’s jurisdiction to minis-
terial decrees, so escalating the scope of legislation that falls under Article 2. Third, it 
underscored the requisite for developing a moderate interpretation of the same article 
that would be reliable with other constitutional provisions defending public rights.24 Fi-
nally, the Court involved in a self-sufficient functional interpretation of both the Qur’an 
and authentic Sunnah. All in all, the Court established its specific interpretation of ij-
tihad irrespective of the opposing attitudes in Islamic jurisprudence, and its classical 
techniques, and thus, it situated itself as a de facto interpreter of divine ideals and legal 
guard on the Sharie‘a values to avoid any extreme ideology or radical philosophy. It 
has advanced a flexible method to interpreting the divine law that differentiates be-
tween “unalterable and universally binding principles, and malleable application of those 
22  LOMBARDI, Clark. Note, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalization 
of the Shari’a in a Modern Arab State. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, New York, vol. 37, 1998. p. 
111-112.
23  LOMBARDI, Clark. Note, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalization 
of the Shari’a in a Modern Arab State. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, New York, vol. 37, 1998. p. 
106-113.
24  LOMBARDI, Clark. Note, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalization 
of the Shari’a in a Modern Arab State. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, New York, vol. 37, 1998. p. 
107-108.
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principles”.25 Laws that breach a strict, irreversible principle are acknowledged unconsti-
tutional and invalid (annulled), but in the meanwhile, ijtihad (contemplation) is allowa-
ble in cases of textual gaps, or where the relevant rules are ambiguous/open ended. 
Moreover, the government has been given comprehensive legislative will in policy are-
as where the Sharie‘a is found to provide uncertain or numerous responses, provided 
that the statutory product does not violate the Sharie‘a spirit (purposes) based upon a 
sensible, impartial secular ijtihad.
Based on that ruling, the individual reasoning rules via a mujtahid (qualified 
scholar) regulate the individuals’ affairs to defending those interests that are legally 
appropriate.26 In Islam, a mujtahid is eligible if possess the (a) ultimate awareness of le-
gislating ayaat al’ahkam (verses) along with the knowledge of Sunnah and its narrator’s 
reliability; (b) understanding of nask’h (abrogating/abrogated provisions) rules based 
on the repel theory; (c) knowledge of ijm‘a (consensus) and the familiarity with ‘ilm 
usul al-fiqh (ijtihad’s methodology through a complete understanding of reasoning); (d) 
mastering the Arabic language along with piety (Islam), and (e) thorough understan-
ding of makasid al-sharie‘a (Sharie‘a objectives). Generally, the mujtahid’s knowledge 
should be necessary in which it can be absolutely certain and then undisputable. This 
ruling is significant to determine the concept of the religious clause in a contemporary 
State constitutions and to track the possibility of a pluralistic interpretation the Sha-
rie‘a reference consistent with the democratic state’s governance.27 The crises of Islamic 
law are due to the conflict with the modern state institutions.28 Likewise, the “eternity 
clause” in the country’s constitution [basic law] is designed to guarantee that the le-
gislation/constitution cannot be altered by amendment, as it recognizes that certain 
principles are part of the legal system, above and beyond the written constitution, and 
must be protected.29
In this case, we have to acknowledge that: (a) the Sharie‘a is mentioned and 
explained in the constitution’s preamble, a place in which the constitutional process is 
described in its complete “temporary references” [a typical element of constitutions, in 
which founding values are expressed by universal timeless formulas for society’s regu-
lation]; (b) both Congress and the SCC have limits to amend the Sharie‘a principles, and 
(c) SCC’s former and recent decisions declared the presence of the Sharie‘a values in a 
25  BROWN, Nathan. Islamic Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice. In: COTRAN, Eugene; SHERIF, Adel. (Eds.). 
Democracy, the Rule of Law and Islam. Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999. p. 491-496.
26  HALLAQ, Wael. A History of Islamic Legal Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
27  ‘ARAFA, Mohamed. Whither Egypt? Against Religious Fascism and Legal Authoritarianism: Pure Revolution, 
Popular Coup, or a Military Coup d’état? Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, Indianopolis, 
vol. 24, n. 4, p. 859-897, 2014. p. 882.
28  HALLAQ, Wael. A History of Islamic Legal Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
29  ABOU EL-FADEL, Khaled. Conceptualizing Shari‘ah in the Modern State. Villanova Law Review, Villanova, 
vol. 56, n. 5, p. 803-818, 2012. p. 810-811.
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position of superiority over the statutory rules.30 Thus, the Sharie‘a eteronomy is not 
in contradiction with the social contract’s nature of the constitution, as a derivative-
-society process.31 The Court’s interpretation of the Islamic rules launched a moderate, 
non-fundamentalist interpretation, so modernizing from traditional fiqh.32 Moreover, 
the SCC’s commitment in the Sharie‘a rules analysis has contributed to the liberal for-
mation’s energies by entrusting the conservation of Egyptian Islamic law to a princi-
pally secular institution–the SCC–while admitting commitment to the Sharie‘a consti-
tutional principality. Besides, though its decisions often take the attitudes of significant 
religious leaders (mufti/al-Azhar Grand Shiekh) into account, the SCC generally likes a 
fairly moderate interpretation of the rules into practical strategies for public life, as it 
yet works as a bumper between this coalition and the strength of radicalism.33 A dis-
tinction between the judicial task (applying the law) and the political role (lawmaking) 
is imperative in that respect, as judges do not apply the Constitution only, they have to 
deduce what it means and entails prior to applying it, and even they have discretion to 
interpret the materials irrespective of how obvious constitutional makers pursue their 
language to be.34
As a matter of fact, once introduced in the constitutional architecture, even the 
Sharie‘a clause desires an interpreter, and it is possible to consider the SCC as a “final” 
constitutional interpreter (Methodology + Coordination with other “interpretative for-
ces”).35 Regarding the plural Sharie‘a and the multiplicity of interpreters, not only ju-
dges may interpret the constitution. Rather, a major democratization flows from the 
intrinsic openness of the constitutional interpretation «who lives the norms may inter-
pret the norms» (Brown & Lombardi 2006).36 Citizens, groups, and judicial bodies are in 
30  SHERIF, Adel. Constitutional Law. In: MAUGIRON Nathalie; DUPRET Baudouin (Eds.). Egypt and its Laws. 
London : Kluwer law international, 2002. p. 25.
31  SULTANY, Nimer. The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy 
and the Project of Political Justification. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Cambridge, vol. 47, 
n. 2, p. 371-455, mar./june 2012. p. 415-416.
32  ELMORR Awad et al. The Supreme Constitutional Court and Its Role in the Egyptian Judicial System. In: 
BOYLE, Kevin; SHERIF, Adel (Eds.). Human Rights and Democracy – The Role of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court of Egypt. Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996.
33  For example, Decision 37, Judicial Year 9 (May 19, 1990) and Decision 25, Judicial Year 16 (July 3, 1995).
34  SULTANY, Nimer. Religion and Constitutionalism: Lessons from American and Islamic Constitutionalism. 
Emory International Law Review, Atlanta, vol. 28, n. 1, 345-424, 2014. p. 374-385; KOPPELMAN, Andrew. 
Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause. Northwestern University Law Review, Evanston, vol. 103, 
n. 2, p. 1-23, 2003.
35  ‘ARAFA, Mohamed. Whither Egypt? Against Religious Fascism and Legal Authoritarianism: Pure Revolution, 
Popular Coup, or a Military Coup d’état? Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, Indianopolis, 
vol. 24, n. 4, p. 859-897, 2014. p. 892-896.
36  BROWN, Nathan; LOMBARDI, Clark. The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and 
Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 
(May 18, 1996). American University International Law Review, Washington, vol. 21, n. 3, p. 437-460, june 
2006.
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a strict sense “informative forces” of the constitution; parties and experts are dynamic 
as pre-interpreters of the law, proposing some sort of interpretations, and the SCC re-
presents a particular mediator between the State and the community, and its role may 
be assumed as a form of democratization of the clauses’ interpretation. Harvard Law 
School Professor Noah Feldman argues that “secularism of the Western variety is not a 
necessary condition of democracy” in order to justify the lack of separation between re-
ligion and State under an “Islamic democracy”.37 Likewise, Lama Abu-Odeh has stated: 
Islamic law should be approached as one, but only one, of the constitutive elements of 
law that has not only been decentered by the transplant but also transformed. Not only 
have its rules been reformed, but also its modes of reasoning, and its jurist class. Its tre-
atises have been turned into codes, and its qadis turned into modern judges. Moreover, 
its internal conceptual organization, has been transformed by being reduced to a rule 
structure positivized in a code and dependent on State enforcement. Consequently, its 
normative hold over people has changed.38
Judicial authorization through a Sharie‘a clause is an diverting secular approach; 
that the obsession with this clause is part of extreme constitutional interest; and that 
validation of religious issues flings the ball from the political field to the legal scene. 
So, constitutionalizing the Sharie‘a hampers the awareness of the main political duty. 
The acknowledgement of the puzzling presence of Islamic constitutionalism (Islam and 
democratic norms) should lead to the constant openness of the compromise between 
the ethical and political arenas (pluralism).39 Thus, when anticipating essential religion 
and state demands, constitutional courts in religious democracies (members’ philoso-
phical favorites + their own perceptive strategies) are powerfully motivated to rule wi-
thin the community’s interests and prospects of liberal groups and authority holders.40 
Supreme Court justices may be observed as tactical artists to the level that they pursue 
to preserve or enrich the court’s influential position vis-à-vis other foremost domestic 
decision, law, and policymaking apparatuses. Judges may agree upon playing it safe 
either by abstaining to decide or issuing equivocal/conventional rulings when the esta-
blished motivation structure or political circumstances within which they function are 
not beneficial to judicial modernization (hyperactivism). This judicial shifting emerges 
a key conundrum: how to guarantee that the courts will release decisions that echo 
37  FELDMAN, Noah. After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy. New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2003. p. 12.
38  ABU-ODEH, Lama. The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia. American 
Journal of Comparative Law, Washington, vol. 52, p. 789-824, jan. 2004. 
39  MOUFFE, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000. p. 13-14; 102-105.
40  MOUSTAFA, Tamir. Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary 
Egypt. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Cambridge, vol. 32, n. 1, p. 3-22, jan. 2000. p. 11-16.
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the authority’s ideological preferences.41 In constitutional systems, particularly those 
functioning in civil law practice, the constitution expressly mentions public rights/fre-
edoms but leaves the issue of their meaning and regulation to legislation and this is a 
latent dodge, as a right can be robbed of much of its significance. In this case, the Court 
recited that “it is improper that any law can destabilize a freedom under the justification 
of regulating its practice, as once Muslims have acknowledged–with conclusiveness–a 
Sharie‘a universal principle (fixed rule in an undoubtedly authentic text with a definite 
meaning), they must follow this principle or rule “as is,” and may not try to elucidate it 
away or reason out an alternative legal norm.”42
Still, there is some evidence that the “religious clause” or “repugnancy clause” 
doctrine is becoming influential within the Arab World. There are academic discussions 
on the topic in books and journals throughout the Middle Eastern and North African 
(“MENA”) region. And the doctrine has migrated to Jordan and most recently to Tunisia. 
It remains to be seen whether these countries will also adopt other elements of the 
Egyptian SCC’s ambitious model. More broadly, it remains to be seen whether the Egyp-
tian structural approach will become a typical way of enforcing a moderate interpreta-
tion of Islamic [Sharie‘a] law both inside and outside Egypt (MENA area, may be Western 
societies [Europe and USA]) as a key to the historic under‐enforcement of this paradox 
through much of the region and as a way to reduce religious extremism.
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